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 Abstract 
 
This paper is concerned with the neglected role of competition 
policy in East Asian development.  Michael Porter considers Japan's 
development to have benefitted from intense competition among 
firms.  By contrast, Caves and Uekusa criticize MITI's role in 
creating recession cartels and entry barriers, which are thought 
to have resulted in allocative inefficiency.  This paper argues 
that competition policy in both Japan and Korea was oriented towards 
creating dynamic efficiency (the highest long term productivity 
growth rate).  It did so by measures, operating at both the industry 
and firm level, which sometimes restricted competition and 
sometimes encouraged it. 
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I  Introduction:  Analytical Context and the Main Policy Issues 
 An important policy issue facing many semi-industrial and 
transition economies today is what kind of anti-trust and 
competition policy they should pursue in order to promote 
industrialisation and economic growth. In terms of economic 
analysis, this boils down to the question of what the optimal degree 
of competition is for promoting dynamic efficiency (in the sense 
of maximising the long term rate of growth of industrial and overall 
productivity). We answer this question here with respect to the 
experience of the outstandingly successful East Asian countries 
- Japan and South Korea.  In view of the extraordinary long term 
economic achievements of these nations in the post-war period 
(Singh, 1993a), this experience is important in its own right and 
for the lessons which other emerging economies may draw from it. 
 The subject is also controversial. In their seminal analysis 
of industrial organisation in Japan, Caves and Uekusa (1976) were 
stringent in their criticism of the Japanese competition policy. 
They concluded that "Its (anti-monopoly policy) failures have 
placed significant costs on the Japanese economy in the form of 
allocative inefficiency and diversion of rivalry into costly 
non-priced forms. We cannot detect any compensating gains." 
(p.157). On the other hand, Michael Porter (1990a) in his  
influential recent work on the competitive advantage of nations 
has argued that the international competitive success of the 
Japanese companies derives in large measure from the intense rivalry 
and competition they face in their domestic markets. "Nowhere", 
he writes, "is the role of fierce rivalry more apparent than in 
Japan . . ." [Porter, 1990b, p82].      
 The importance of strict competition policy in a more general 
context has been stressed by the World Bank in its recent advocacy 
 
 
 2 
of a "market friendly" approach to development. (World Bank 1991). 
The Bank observes:"Competitive markets are the best way yet found 
for efficiently organising the production and distribution of goods 
and services. Domestic and external competition provides the 
incentives that unleash entrepreneurship and technological 
progress".
1
 
 Until relatively recently, the traditional economic theory's 
answer to the question of optimal degree of competition was simple: 
maximum competition.  As Telser (1987) notes:  "It is hard for many 
economists to accept the proposition that competition may be 
excessive because the received theory regards competition as always 
good, the more there is the better".  Although earlier 
contributions by Schumpeter (1942) and Richardson (1965) among 
others had seriously called into question the optimality of maximum 
competition for investment and technical progress and hence dynamic 
efficiency, these contributions were effectively ignored by the 
profession.   However, in the last fifteen years, new developments 
in the theories of industrial organisation and international trade 
have resurrected such heterodox ideas.  There now exists 
considerable  literature which points out the shortcomings of 
unfettered competition, whether internal or external, even for 
static efficiency let alone in its dynamic form.
2
 
 Important practical policy issues which naturally arise from 
these theoretical developments in the two fields are:  if total 
                                                 
     
1
 World Bank(1991), page 1. This assertion is highly 
controversial (see Singh,1993b), not least of all because the East 
Asian evidence, as we shall see later, does not support it. 
     
2
 For reviews of the new industrial organisation literature 
see Jacquemin(1987), Schmalensee and Willig (1989), Tirole (1990); 
for international trade, see Helpman and Krugman (1989).  For 
implications of the new industrial organisation theory for 
antitrust policies in advanced countries, see Jorde and Teece 
(1992).  
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openness to international competition and maximum domestic 
competition are not necessarily optimal, what is the appropriate 
level of openness or degree of domestic competition for an economy? 
  The economic failings of the highly monopolised and closed 
centrally planned economies of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet 
Union do not suggest that the other extreme of almost zero 
competition and almost zero openness has much to recommend it 
either.  In this context the competition policy record of the 
exemplar East Asian economies which have purposefully desisted from 
either extreme, as we shall see below, assume special significance. 
 In what follows, for reasons of space, we concentrate more 
on domestic rather than foreign competition although we refer to 
the latter where appropriate.
3
  For similar reasons, we also confine 
our attention to product markets, and do not discuss the factor 
markets.  Moreover, we consider here the Japanese experience only 
during 1950 -1973, the period of Japan's most rapid growth and the 
one which is most relevant from the standpoint of the emerging 
nations (See further Singh, 1989). 
II     Antitrust and Guided Competition in Japan                 
               
 The Japanese inherited their antitrust laws from the U.S. 
occupation authorities after World War II.  These were robust pro 
- competition measures modelled on the U.S. pattern and based on 
U.S. philosophical conceptions.  In the immediate post-war period, 
the laws were strictly enforced and were successful in dismantling 
the leading pre-war zaibatsu - the large industrial groups which 
had dominated the Japanese inter-war economy - and were in the U.S. 
eyes responsible for the Japanese war preparations.  However, soon 
                                                 
     
3
 For an analysis of the optimum degree of economic openness, 
see Chakravarty and Singh (1988). 
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afterwards, under the pressure of the cold war, a rapid erosion 
of the competition laws, both defacto and dejure, started to occur. 
 This included interalia the re-groupment, with government 
encouragement, of the old zaibatsu into somewhat looser groupings, 
the keiretsu.   
 As Caves and Uekusa note, these antitrust laws had no domestic 
constituency in Japan at the time.  More importantly, apart from 
being imposed by alien occupation authorities, they were also 
apparently alien to the basic economic philosophy of the Japanese 
ruling circles.  Okimoto (1989) observes:  "... the Japanese 
government takes a more pragmatic approach to antitrust 
enforcement, one that makes allowances for national goals such as 
industrial catch-up.  It takes into account other collective values 
and extenuating circumstances in weighing enforcement decisions 
against the letter and spirit of antitrust laws.  Included here 
are such considerations as economies of scale, enhanced efficiency, 
optimal use of scarce resources, international competitiveness, 
heightened productivity, business cycle stabilization, industrial 
orderliness, price stabilization and economic security." 
(pp.12-13). 
 In short to promote investment and technical  change, instead 
of permitting unfettered competition, the Japanese government has 
controlled and guided domestic competition in a purposeful manner. 
Competition has both been encouraged, but notably also restricted 
in a number of ways.  This has been particularly true during the 
years of rapid growth, 1950 - 1973.  The agency primarily 
responsible for the antitrust enforcement in Japan is the Fair Trade 
Commission.  However, in the Japanese scheme of government, it has 
much less power compared with MITI which is responsible for the 
country's industrial policy.  Although the FTC has never been 
entirely toothless and antitrust-enforcement  in Japan is not a 
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totally meaningless charade, most scholars agree that in any 
conflict between the two agencies' objectives (e.g. over the 
promotion of large scale firms or price fixing arrangements during 
a business cycle downturn), it is MITI and its industrial policy 
which by and large have prevailed over the FTC and the competition 
policy. 
 To illustrate, it is useful to reflect on some of the blatant 
restrictions which were imposed by the Japanese Government in the 
1950s and 1960s on domestic product market competition. To meet 
its myriad goals which continually changed in the light of economic 
circumstances facing the country, MITI encouraged a variety of 
cartel arrangements in a wide range of industries ─ export and import 
cartels, cartels to combat depression or excessive competition, 
rationalization cartels, etc.   According to Caves and Uekusa, in 
the 1960s, cartels accounted for 78.1 percent of the value of 
shipments in textiles; 64.8 percent in clothing; 50.0 percent in 
non-ferrous metals; 47 percent in printing and publishing; 41.2 
percent in stone, clay and glass; 34.5 percent in steel products, 
and 37.2 percent in food products.  Although these cartels 
functioned for only limited periods of time and there was wide 
variation in their effectiveness,  Caves and Uekusa observed that 
"their mere presence in such broad stretches of the manufacturing 
sector attests to their importance." (page 147). 
 Similarly, believing that large scale enterprises were 
required for promotion of technical change and for Japanese firms 
to compete effectively with their western counterparts, MITI 
encouraged mergers between leading firms in key industries. The 
fact that the agency did not always succeed in its efforts (notably 
in the car and machine tool industries) does not detract from the 
anti-competitive bias of many of MITI's policies and actions. The 
anti-competitive actions were often re-enforced through MITI's use 
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of "administrative guidance" to firms and its discreet directions 
to industry associations with whom it invariably had close links. 
 However, these restraints on competition are only a part of 
the story. An equally significant part is MITI's strong 
encouragement of vigorous domestic oligopolistic rivalry and 
international competitiveness. In general, whether competition was 
promoted or restricted depended on the industry and its life-cycle: 
in young industries, during the developmental phase, the government 
discouraged competition; when these industries became 
technologically mature, competition was allowed to flourish.  
Later, when industries are in competitive decline, the government 
again discourages competition and attempts to bring about an orderly 
rationalization of the industry (Okimoto, 1990).   
 Yamamura (1988) provides a useful dynamic model of Japanese 
industrial policy and the meaning and the role of competition within 
it.  During the rapid growth phase of Japanese development in the 
1950s and 1960s, in the key industries which were receiving its 
attention, MITI  essentially organized an "investment race" among 
large oligopolistic firms in which exports and international market 
share were significant performance goals.  As in the real world 
markets are always incomplete, such a race without a coordinator 
could lead to ruinous competition, price wars and excess capacity, 
inhibiting the inducement to invest.  In the Japanese economic 
miracle, MITI provided this crucial coordinating role and 
orchestrated the dynamic combination of collusion and competition 
which characterizes Japanese industrial policy.  "In a nutshell," 
Yamamura observes "what MITI did was to 'guide' the firms to invest 
in such a way that each large firm in a market expanded its productive 
capacity roughly in proportion to its current market share─no firm 
was to make an investment so large that it would destabilize the 
market.  The policy was effective in encouraging competition for 
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the market share (thus preserving the essential competitiveness 
of the industrial markets) while reducing the risk of losses due 
to excessive investment.  Thus it promoted the aggressive expansion 
of capacity necessary to increase productive efficiency in output" 
(p 175) 
 Turning briefly to the role of foreign competition, protection 
was of central importance in Japanese industrial development during 
the miracle years. Clearly the trade policy had to be complementary 
to the competition policy for otherwise a recession cartel, for 
example, could have been easily overwhelmed by foreign imports. 
Similarly, import restrictions could have overwhelmed competition 
altogether were it not for the performance standards that industries 
receiving protection were forced to meet by the government (through, 
for instance, MITI's control over foreign exchange, etc.).
4
  During 
the 1950s and 1960s, the Japanese economy operated under a regime 
of draconian import controls, whether practised formally or 
informally.  As late as 1978, manufactured imports constituted only 
2.4% of the Japanese GDP; the corresponding proportion in Britain 
and other countries of the EEC was five to six times larger.  Even 
in the US which traditionally, because of its continental size, 
has a relatively closed economy, the volume of imported manufactured 
goods in the late 1970s was proportionally almost twice as large 
as in Japan. (Singh,1993b). 
  Protection, together with restrictions on domestic 
competition, provided the Japanese companies with a captive home 
market leading to high profits which enabled them to undertake high 
                                                 
     
4
 To illustrate, Japan's machine tool industry was given 
selective tariff protection specifically for those machine tools 
with potentially high income elasticities of demand and high 
productivity growth rates. But machine tool builders benefiting 
from protection were required to produce at least 50% of their output 
in the form of computer numerically controlled machine tools by 
a certain date (Amsden and Hikino,1993). 
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rates of investment, to improve the quality of their products, and 
also to capture markets abroad.  The latter was of particular 
importance to Japanese firms, since in return for protection, MITI 
often imposed on them export and world market share performance 
targets.  Companies recognized that to move forward, to have access 
to foreign technology, licenses etc., they had to export.  The 
emphasis on exports and on maintaining oligopolistic rivalry - 
instead of concentrating resources and subsidies on a single 
"national champion", which many governments in their industrial 
policies are prone to do - are the key factors which distinguish 
Japanese policies from those of other dirigiste countries.   
 At the empirical level, there is an apparent paradox in the 
operations of the Japanese industrial and competition policies 
during the high growth period.  Although MITI fostered 
oligopolistic rivalry and investment races among large firms, as 
seen earlier, it was also responsible for weakening Japan's 
anti-monopoly laws. Nevertheless, as measured by conventional 
industry concentration ratios, competition increased, i.e., 
concentration ratios generally declined. 
 It is possible to compute concentration ratios for 20 leading 
industries based on data from the Fair Trade Commission compiled 
by Nakamura (1981) for years spanning the prewar and early postwar 
periods. The average (unweighted) 3-firm concentration ratio was 
57.6 in 1937, 53.5 in 1950, and 44.1 in 1962.  Between 1950 and 
1962, concentration increased in only three of 20 industries, stayed 
roughly the same in two, and fell in all the rest. Similarly 
Iguchi(1987) shows that aggregate concentration (share of the 
hundred largest manufacturing firms in total sales) in Japan 
declined sharply in the 1950s, remained constant or fell slightly 
in the 1960s, but rose significantly in the 1970s. 
 The answer to this apparent paradox is not difficult to see. 
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 Industrial concentration declined not because of the effectiveness 
of the anti-monopoly legislation, but because of the rapid growth 
of the economy. [Cf. Caves and Uekusa, 1976, p28]. High levels of 
investment in Japan after 1950 went hand-in-hand in leading 
industries with new entry or expansion of smaller firms. Iguchi 
reports that the new entry was particulary important in reducing 
concentration in the 1950s. 
 That rapid industrial growth generally, but not always
5
, 
reduces concentration is not a paradox. It accords with economic 
analysis as well as empirical evidence from other industrial 
countries. The essential point however is that, for the reasons 
outlined earlier, without MITI's industrial policy and restraints 
on competition, these high rates of investment and economic growth 
in Japan might arguably not have occurred at all.
6
 Thus in contrast 
to the conventional paradigm in economic development (see for 
example World Bank, 1991), which proposes that competition leads 
to economic growth, the Japanese experience suggests reverse 
causality; that it was growth which stimulated competition, at least 
in the sense of reducing industrial concentration, rather than the 
other way round.
7
 
                                                 
     
5
 There are two forces at work here - births of new firms and 
the relative rates of growth of small and large firms. If large 
firms grow at a faster rate than small firms, the effect of this 
maybe greater than that of new entry, and thus increase 
concentration.  See further Hughes and Singh(1980). See also the 
discussion of the Korean case in the next section. 
     
6
 Some economists suggest that the Japanese miracle would have 
occurred without the industrial policy. For a systematic critique 
of this view, see Boltho (1985). Similarly, others argue that MITI's 
competition policy measures to attain dynamic efficiency created 
serious economic imbalances in the affected industries. For a 
critical analysis of this argument, see Okimoto (1989).   
     
7
This is not to suggest that the Japanese growth was entirely 
due to MITI's policies - many other factors were also significant. 
 Similarly, Uekusa (1977) has argued that the occupation 
authorities deconcentration measures would also have helped 
increase new entry of firms.  Moreover, lower industrial 
concentration does not necessarily imply reduced monopoly power 
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 Similarly, at the theoretical level, although MITI's 
competition and industrial policies  may go against the conceptions 
of competition in traditional economic theory with its emphasis 
on static allocative efficiency, they are fully compatible with 
many of the new developments in the theory of industrial 
organisation.  There now exist a variety of theoretical models 
which can provide a formal justification for the various aspects 
of the highly successful combination of cooperation and competition 
which MITI fostered in Japan.
8
  However, as Scherer(1992) has 
observed in relation to game theoretic models of innovation, "with 
the appropriate constellation of assumptions virtually anything 
can be shown to happen."  In that context the actual experience 
of Japan in the miracle years is extremely valuable in providing 
a practical illustration of some of the concepts and analyses of 
such models.                
III Product Market Competition in South Korea 
 
  Whereas rapid growth in Japan was accompanied by declining 
industrial concentration (until the mid-1960s), the relationship 
between the two variables in South Korea was less straight-forward 
(in the high growth period 1970-1982). Korea grew rapidly to be 
sure, and anecdotal evidence strongly suggests that competition 
among Korea's large and diversified business groups was also fierce. 
But growth was not accompanied by declining concentration at either 
the industry or aggregate levels due to the pattern of industrial 
                                                                                                                                                                     
of dominant firms, or an increase in consumer welfare in the sense 
of traditional welfare economics.  Hughes and Singh (1980). 
     
8
There are many models which indicate that "excessive" or 
unrestricted entry (i.e., fully contestable markets) although 
useful for static allocative efficiency, is not compatible with 
dynamic efficiency. See Baumol and Ordover (1992). Similarly game 
theoretic models of innovation races, spillovers, appropriability 
conditions, the first mover advantage, the free rider problem, 
asymmetric information, are also pertinent. For references, see 
footnote 2.  
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expansion:  "Korea's growth in value added is due first to expansion 
of existing firms, second to entry of offspring firms, and only 
to a minor extent to net entrance of new entrepreneurs" (Jones and 
Sakong, 1980, p.176). 
 The output of the top 5 and 10 business groups grew much faster 
than GDP, so that aggregate economic concentration rose 
spectacularly (Kim, 1987).  Korea's all-industry average 3-firm 
concentration ratio remained higher than Japan's --- 62% compared 
with 56.3% respectively (in the early 1980s). Between 1970 and 1982 
the share of total manufacturing shipments produced under a 
competitive market structure decreased from roughly 40% to 30%, 
while the share produced by oligopolies increased from 35% to 50% 
(Lee, et. al., 1986).
9
 
 Nevertheless, there is ample evidence that the big business 
groups still exhibited highly rivalrous behaviour (Kim, 1992). This 
was because under rapid growth conditions, as well as the rules 
of the game which the state had established, there was neither the 
incentive nor the ability for big business to collude.  The Korean 
government both contributed to the rise of big business, through 
its licensing and subsidized credit policies (it owned or controlled 
virtually all financial institutions), and went out of its way to 
insure that big business did not collude, by allocating subsidies 
only in exchange for strict performance standards (Amsden, 1989). 
 After 1975 inter-group competition in Korea heated-up as each 
cheabol, or diversified business group, tried to qualify for 
                                                 
     
9
By 1987, however, the share of shipments in Korea produced 
under competitive market conditions did, in fact, rise, to 43%, 
while the share accounted for by oligopolies fell, to 40% (Lee and 
Lee, 1990).  This rise of competition cannot be attributed to 
anti-monopoly legislation, which was introduced in the 1980s but 
which was implemented only weakly and sporadically. Thus, as in 
Japan, rapid growth in Korea was accompanied ultimately by declining 
industry concentration.  
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generous subsidies to establish a general trading company by meeting 
government performance standards regarding minimum export volume 
and number of export products (Cho, 1987). 
 The importance of state discipline over big business was 
appreciated by Korean President Park Chung Hee, along with his keen 
appreciation (some would say to a fault) of the central role of 
big business in catching up. He wrote: "One of the essential 
characteristics of a modern economy is its strong tendency towards 
centralization.  Mammoth enterprise--considered indispensable, at 
the moment, to our country--plays not only a decisive role in the 
economic development and elevation of living standards, but 
further, brings about changes in the structure of society and the 
economy... Therefore, the key problems facing a free economic policy 
are coordination and supervisory guidance, by the state, of mammoth 
economic strength" (1962, pp.228-229, as cited in Amsden, 1994). 
Even more so than in Japan, therefore, growth and competition in 
Korea were characterised by "administrative guidance". 
 Although the Korean government disciplined subsidy 
recipients, it also supported them for lengthy periods until they 
ultimately became internationally competitive.  This enabled firms 
to have long time horizons for their investment plans. For example, 
in the Korean automobile industry, for 30 years no foreign cars 
were to be seen on Korean roads and no Korean cars were to be seen 
on foreign roads.  All the same, the industry's leader, the 90% 
locally-owned Hundai Motor Company, became the first 
late-industrialising automobile maker to export to Europe and the 
United States (Amsden, 1989). As Kim Mahn-Je, the first president 
of the Korean Development Institute, has noted: "It is true that 
the success of the Korean automobile industry was achieved by 
private initiatives. But it is also true that the success could 
hardly be attributed to market competition per se. Korean 
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automobiles faced severe competition in the export frontiers. 
However, it was not market competition that stimulated the industry 
to grow strong enough to venture into the world market. I am not 
arguing that market competition was useless. Rather, I would like 
to point out that the environment was provided in which the private 
sectors' creativity and responsibility could be maximised" (1992, 
p.45).   
IV Conclusion 
 The analysis of this paper demonstrates that industrial policy 
has dominated competition policy both in Japan and South Korea. 
 The central objective of competition policy in these economies 
has been dynamic rather than static efficiency. Instead of maximum 
competition, these countries have therefore deliberately 
restricted it in many directions in order to increase their 
investment rate and to accelerate their technological development. 
However, competition, but not of the traditional textbook variety, 
has also been encouraged in important ways: both Japan and Korea 
have fostered intense oligopolistic rivalry in individual 
industries among competing conglomerates.    
 The paper shows that during much of the high growth period 
in Japan, despite all the government restrictions on competition, 
industrial concentration actually fell.  This was due to the fact 
that investment and output rose rapidly, leading to sizeable new 
entry and fast growth of small firms.  Thus in contrast to the 
conventional paradigm in economic development, it was growth which 
led to increased competition and reduced concentration, rather than 
the other way around.  Moreover, contrary to this paradigm, it is 
certainly arguable that without the government control of 
competition and monitoring of investment "races", such high growth 
rates may not have materialized in the first place. 
 It has also been suggested here that the practical experience 
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of these countries in guiding competition, in creating a highly 
successful combination of co-operation and competition, can be 
rationalised in terms of the recent new developments in the theory 
of industrial organisation and international trade.  On the face 
of it, the East Asian experience would also appear to be consonant 
with the vision of "plausible capitalism" in Schumpeter (1942), 
where large oligopolistic corporations are the main vehicles of 
technological progress. However, this is only true as far as it 
goes, since an essential feature of East Asian development has been 
the crucial role of the government in controlling the competitive 
process, setting performance standards and implementing other 
industrial policy measures.  There is no such industrial policy 
role for the government in "plausible capitalism".
10
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